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ARTICLES
Absolute Positivism
Christoph Kletzer
1  Introduction
Legal positivists are often accused of being unable to avoid the contradiction that
follows from the attempt to formulate a theory of law which tries to adequately
preserve and theoretically capture the normativity of the law, yet at the same
time takes the law’s content and existence to depend entirely on fact and not on
its merit. Our first intuition in relation to such a theory might be that it cannot
be very promising. After all, how could anything ever be normative irrespective of
its merit? If the law’s content and validity are dependent entirely on fact, how can
it ever be or claim to be normative in a more than figurative sense? It takes a sec-
ond glance to find a promise of coherence in such a positivistic enterprise, and
this promise is mostly found in taking positivism to steer a middle way between
reductivist realism and natural law theory. Yet on a third glance, to most, every-
thing turns back into nonsense again.
To Anglo-American readers Kelsen’s Pure Theory is, next to Hart’s positivism, the
most famous of these attempted middle ways, a way the attractiveness of which
cannot stand a third glance. The various critical attacks levelled against the Pure
Theory concur in the claim that even if we tidy up all the versions and formula-
tions of it, even if we bring together all the different doctrines and iron out sur-
face inconsistencies, what we are left with is a theory which on its most favoura-
ble reading carries a fundamental contradiction at its core. Even authors, who,
like Stanley L. Paulson, can hardly be accused of trying to misunderstand Kelsen,
cannot shake off the feeling that Kelsen is ‘running off in two different directions
at once.’1 Antonio Bulygin famously referred to a fundamental ‘antinomy’ in Kel-
sen’s work.2 If we take these to be the last words on the Pure Theory, then it is
hard to see how the latter can ever be more than a partially interesting political
theory supported by a set of applaudable political and moral convictions and how
it could hardly ever be worthy of the serious academic engagement it actually
attracts.
What is barely ever considered is the possibility that the contradiction stems
from the very idea that Kelsen tries to steer a middle way. After all, it is hard to
see how one could drive a middle way between moralism and reductionism with-
out entering a lazy compromise, without ignoring the contradiction that such a
1 Stanley L. Paulson, ‘The Weak Reading of Authority in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law,’ Law
and Philosophy 19 (2009): 131-71, 167.
2 Eugenion Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law,’ Ratio Juris 3 (1990): 29-45.
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compromise necessarily involves. However, what if the Pure Theory, in contrast
to Hart’s positivism, never attempted a middle way? Put differently, what if the
Pure Theory attempted a ‘middle way’ between reductionism and moralism only
in the way in which Kant drove a ‘middle way’ between rationalism and empiri-
cism, that is, no real middle way at all? After all, the Kantian solution to the great
philosophic impasse has not been conciliatory, but radical: what Kant attempted
was not to reconcile two opposed world views by creating a syncretistic compro-
mise of both, but to turn everything upside down and to submit the very possibil-
ity of us relating to the world to a fundamental reassessment. Kant did not intro-
duce a compromise, but a Revolution der Denkungsart, an intellectual revolution.
Now, this paper suggests that Kelsen indeed had a fundamentally Kantian solu-
tion to the jurisprudential impasse and that when we actually do read Kelsen with
Kant, we can see that the heart of the Kelsenian teaching does not lie in simply
proposing a new concept of law, but rather in rethinking the possibility of us relat-
ing to the law qua possible object of knowledge and in submitting this possible
relation to a revolutionary overturn. Kelsen tried to solve the problem of the
ontology of the law (‘What is law?’) by translating it into a revolutionary, a ‘tran-
scendental,’ epistemology (‘How can we relate to the law qua possible object of
knowledge and how do we have to conceive of a law to which we can actually
relate?’). It turns out that our implicit, everyday epistemology of our relation to
the law, even though held dear by common sense, actually is incoherent, impossi-
ble and ultimately has to be jettisoned.
Now, even though such a radically Kantian approach to Kelsen is hardly new or
revolutionary, not much has been made of it so far and the greatest intellectual
effort has been spent on the previously devised, un-Kantian, model of the middle
way, even though this model is neither very challenging intellectually nor prom-
ises many chances of success.
The present reading starts with the assumption that the Pure Theory can only
hope to be successful if it does not try to steer a middle way between reduction-
ism and moralism, but if it tries to overcome the opposition by making clear that
both opponents of the opposition rest on the same ill-conceived convictions
about legal validity. Both take it that the law cannot be normative from itself.
Here natural law theory and reductionism agree. By correcting this conviction the
Pure Theory does not present a middle way between the suppositious opponents,
but it presents a true alternative to a spurious alternative; it does not present a
third way, but an actual second way.
Kelsen’s actual solution starts with the demonstration that moralism and reduc-
tionism are both half-truths, the strengths of which cannot simply be added in
order to get a full truth. Rather, Kelsen demonstrates, quite in line with the Kant-
ian resolution of the antinomy, that both theses are expressions of the same erro-
neous approach to the law. Both take the law to be derivative of something else.
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In contrast to this, the Pure Theory tries to find a new approach to the under-
standing of the law, an approach that takes seriously the constitutive functions of
the law. It tries to understand the validity of the law as resting in the law itself. As
such it is an attempt to find a philosophically satisfactory formulation of absolute
positivism.
2  Absolute Positivism
If, for now, we identify positivism with the thesis that
(R1) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid does not
depend on its merits3
or with
(R2) The validity and the content of the positive law cannot be derived from
moral premises
then positivism presents itself as a negative or relative position, i.e., as the rejec-
tion of certain normative relations of derivation. Positivism, understood in this
way, first and foremost tells us what the law is not. We will call this kind of positi-
vism ‘negative,’ or ‘relative positivism.’4
However, the question is not only what the law is not. It is also, what the law is.
Now, a provisional, working definition of absolute positivism emerges when we
try to answer this positive question without abandoning our commitment to rela-
tive positivism. What would such an answer look like? All that is left to base the
validity and content of the law on would be the law itself. A theory that tries to
base the validity of the law on the law itself or, which is the same, on nothing,
could be called positive, or absolute positivism:
(A1) In any legal system whether a given norm is legally valid depends entirely
on the law.
Or:
3 Gardner’s definition runs: ‘(LP) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and
hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits.’
However, he also claims that ‘“source” is to be read broadly such that any intelligible argument
for the validity of a norm counts as source-based if it is not merit-based.’ Gardner takes the two
categories source and merit to be ‘jointly exhaustive of the possible conditions of validity of any
norm.’ However curious such a claim or stipulation may be, it does allow us to omit as redundant
the sources element from the definition of positivism. See John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 1/2
Myths,’ The American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 199-227.
4 For an instructive typology and historical discussion of positivism and its schools see Brian Bix,
‘Legal Positivism,’ in Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Martin P. Gold-
ing & William A. Edmundson (London: Blackwell, 2005), 29.
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(A2) The validity and the content of the positive law is based in the law itself,
or, which is the same: on nothing.
All we have done here is to make explicit what is already present in R1 and R2.
However, since contemporary Anglo-American positivism does not want to upset
common sense, it is in its essence relative positivism. It mainly consists in not
making explicit the radical thought already implicit in relative positivism. Its
main claim thus is that all law is ‘source based.’ However, it does not draw the
conclusion or make explicit that by maintaining that the law is ‘source based’ it
has already claimed that the law is law-based or, which is the same, that the law
is, in an important respect, base-less.
One way to block insight into the radicality of positivism is to divorce questions
about the criteria of membership from questions about the criteria of the authority
or bindingness of the law. Such a move is meant to delegate all quirky questions of
normativity to a theory different from the sources thesis and to thus take explan-
atory pressure off the latter. However, it is hard to see how this could solve rather
than exacerbate the problem: (1) divorcing the two questions simply adds another
pressing question to an already pressing one; (2) by divorcing the question of nor-
mativity from the question of membership one has admitted that the normativity
of the law cannot be a function of the law qua law, but that it has to come from
somewhere else, be it from a comprehensive moral theory (Finnis) or teleological
relations to right reasons (Raz); by doing that, however, one has admitted that
the real theoretical weight is lifted by that other theory and that the law just plays
a certain role in what is fundamentally a moral theory;5 this unwittingly turns
positivism from a comprehensive legal theory into an accidental element of a
moral theory; (3) finally, in however manner the problem of bindingness is ulti-
mately thought to be solved (and I share Kelsen’s view that it cannot be solved in
separation from the question of membership) it still leaves the problem of the
baselessness of the criteria of membership unsolved.
In contrast to that, Kelsen’s Pure Theory is at least partially the attempt to make
philosophical sense of absolute positivism and to bite the bullet of the challenges
of common sense.
As its title already suggests, the Pure Theory demands purity. This means that it
deals with the positive law and the positive law alone. Thus it cannot consider any
principles beyond the law and it accordingly has to answer the question of the val-
5 See Philip Soper, ‘Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law,’ Michigan Law Review 90 (1992):
2393-2423. I do not think that Raz’ practical difference thesis, i.e., the claim that in order to be
authoritative the law has to purport to make a practical difference by excluding or pre-empting
appeal to dependent reasons, which include first-order moral reasons, does get us very far here,
since the question whether the law actually does make a practical difference has, in turn, to be
decided by moral reasons. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
ch. 3. See also Scott Shapiro, ‘The Difference That Rules Make,’ in Analyzing Law: New Essays in
Legal Theory, ed. Brian Bix (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 39 and Jules Coleman, ‘Incorpora-
tionism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis,’ Legal Theory 4 (1998): 381.
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idity of the law from the law itself. In this attempt to perform the seemingly
impossible lies the essence of the Pure Theory and in this attempt it is more pro-
gramme than completed doctrine.
Of course, at first sight, the programme to base the validity of the law in the law
itself must seem futile. How should the law ever be able to ground and constitute
itself? What could this even mean?
Kelsen answers this question indirectly, via the detour of a sceptical argument
about the derivation of validity in general. After all, it is not only absolute positi-
vism that struggles with the derivation of validity. Rather, when trying to account
for legal validity, relative positivism faces problems of its own kind, problems
which, when attended closely, turn out not to be mere obstacles, but impossibili-
ties of a principled kind.
Relative positivism faces the following well known, but still fundamental prob-
lem: assuming that no legal norm is valid in itself, that no legal norm is valid
because of its content, but that it has to be posited in order to be valid, then each
legal norm depends for its validity on another legal norm, since being posited
means being lawfully posited, which in turn means being posited according to a
valid legal norm. Now, if the validity of every legal norm necessarily depends on
the validity of another legal norm, then we can demonstrate, in line with the clas-
sic pyrrhonic argument, that there can exist no valid legal norms at all, since the
resulting chain of derivations of validity, just as any chain of derivations, leads to
the following trilemma:6 we either get (1) an infinite regress, or (2) a logical circle or
(3) a dogmatic acceptance of certain truths, i.e., the abandonment of derivation as
such.
Option (3) does not even attempt to present a solution to the problem, but is
simply an abandonment of the premise, i.e., of the universal need for derivation,
or, in our case, the abandonment of the universal positivity of the law. Any legal
norm can be justified by claiming that certain norms are valid in and from them-
selves.
According to (1), however, no legal norm at all can be valid: an infinite regress
means that a final justification cannot be reached and thus no norm is thoroughly
justified.
Finally, option (2) again allows any legal norm to be valid, since every possible legal
norm can be derived from a logical circle.
The trilemma shows us that with logical necessity the premise of positivism, i.e.,
the requirement of legal norms to be based in other legal norms, leads to the sit-
uation in which either no law or any possible law can be valid. Or, put differently: if
there is to be valid law, then anything is law and if not anything is to be law, then
nothing can be law.
6 Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), 15.
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Now, contemporary Anglo-American positivism is but a formulation of this para-
dox. It primarily consists in moving about the horns of the trilemma and in trying
to combine circularity and dogmatism, i.e., to combine the methods of validating
any law with the method of validating no law in such a way that the specific valid-
ity of the law can be explained. Contemporary Anglo-American positivism finds
its most comprehensive formulation in the so-called sources thesis, which states
that the question of whether a legal norm is legally valid depends on the sources
of this legal norm and not on its moral merit.7 With that, however, we have
before us less of a theory of law and more of the formulation of a problem,
namely the aforementioned trilemma: how can a norm meaningfully derive its
validity from a source, which itself is in need to derive its validity from another
source, without either leading into an infinite regress, a circularity or giving up
the requirement of derivation?
The situation is quite clear in Hart and has been discussed many times. Hart takes
the regress to find its end in the rule of recognition.8 In order to escape dogma-
tism, i.e., in order not to link the capacity of the rule of recognition to end the
regress to some special intrinsic quality of the rule of recognition, in some ele-
ment of its content, he says that the rule of recognition is a rule which is accepted
by the organs of the given legal community.9 However, thereby he has escaped
dogmatism only at the cost of accepting circularity:10 the rule of recognition
depends for its validity on the acceptance by organs, the organ-character of which
in turn depends on legal norms, the validity of which can be traced to the rule of
recognition.11
With such a circle, everything can be justified: I can, for instance, set up the state
of Egopolis, a legal system the rule of recognition of which states that everything
I declare law, immediately becomes law. In my legislative function I then declare
myself to be the only organ of the state of Egopolis and in my function as organ
7 ‘(LP) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part
of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits.’ Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism,’
199-227.
8 Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 94.
9 Ibid., 114.
10 For a recent discussion of this circularity and attempts at its solution see Brian Tamanaha,
‘Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurisprudence,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21 (2001):
1-32 and Keith Culver & Mike Guidice, Legality’s Border (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
11 One might be tempted to think that Kelsen and Hart here deal with different questions: whereas
Hart’s rule of recognition mainly offers a solution to the problem of membership, i.e., the ques-
tion of which norms belong to a legal order, Kelsen’s basic norm wants to answer the question of
validity which in his view also includes the question of the binding nature of norms. Now, Hart
does, of course, also tackle the problem of validity and bindingness. The main difference is that,
in contrast to Kelsen, for Hart it does make sense to look at membership in isolation, i.e., from a
purely external point of view, whereas for Kelsen it is pointless to think about membership with-
out also considering validity. What matters for the present discussion, however, is that both do
actually deal with both questions and the difference can be disregarded at this stage. See Carlos
Santiago Nino, ‘Some Confusions Surrounding Kelsen’s Concept of Validity,’ in Normativity and
Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 253-61.
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of the state of Egopolis I accept the rule of recognition. Then I posit further legal
norms. The validity of these legal norms can be traced to a rule of recognition,
which is valid since it is accepted by the organs of the legal order, i.e., by me. Thus
everything I declare to be law thereby is valid law.
In order to escape the arbitrariness of the grounding of validity in such circles,
Hart introduced a further condition of validity: it is not enough for the rule of
recognition to be accepted by the organs, the norms flowing from it also have to
be by and large obeyed by the subjects, i.e., the legal order has to be effective.12
And precisely this is not the case in the above outlined state of Egopolis. It might
thus seem that the problem of circularity and thus the problem of the validity of
arbitrary norms is solved.
Unfortunately, Hart solved the problem of circularity by introducing a condition
which is not itself legally justified and which thus can only apply dogmatically:
from within the myriad of rules of recognition which can be legitimized by a cir-
cular argument, this shall be valid, which is actually obeyed by the subjects. Or,
put differently: for each legal order that is actually obeyed, a circular argument
can be found which legitimizes the rule of recognition. Thus as a circular argu-
ment the rule of recognition simply provides legitimacy to any given effective
legal order, or, to be precise: it provides the semblance of legitimacy. In truth the
normativity shall not be conditioned by the rule of recognition itself, but by the
effectivity of the legal order. The century old question, how normativity can be
derived from effectivity, how validity can be derived from obedience, is not solved
but obscured by conjuring up the circular argument.13
Hart does not solve the problem of the specific validity of the positive law, but he
veils it by switching between circularity and dogmatism in order to escape an
infinite regress.
Theories that add moral elements, like Dworkin’s interpretivism or Finnis’ natu-
ral law theory, at least in the respect discussed here, do not fare much better.
Rather, the problem of justification of validity of the law is partly obfuscated,
partly exacerbated by the addition of moral norms, which are themselves in want
of justification.
Now, the trilemma argument does not simply state that it is problematic or diffi-
cult to find validity in chains of derivation, but it demonstrates that it is logically
impossible to derive validity at all. Note the strengths of the claim: derivation of
12 Hart, The Concept of Law, 117.
13 For a discussion of this issue see Andrei Marmor, ‘Legal Conventionalism,’ Legal Theory 4 (1998):
509 and Gerald Postema, ‘Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law,’ Oxford Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 11 (1982): 165. For an attempt to find a solution via efficacy see Gerald Post-
ema, ‘Conformity, Custom, and Congruence: Rethinking the Efficacy of Law,’ in The Legacy of
H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy, ed. Matthew H. Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Col-
burn, & Antony Hatzistavrou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 46.
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validity is logically impossible. This is the only true absolute result that relative
positivism can provide.
Now, the curious twist of absolute positivism and the Pure Theory is to base its
own constitution of validity on this logical impossibility. It is, so to speak, only in
the transit through absolute scepticism about validity that the necessity of abso-
lute positivism becomes clear. Whereas modern Anglo-American positivism
despairs over the logical acuteness of this scepticism, the Pure Theory, insofar as
it is an attempt to find a formulation of absolute positivism, takes the strictness
of this sceptical insight as its origin. The truth of relative positivism lies in the
insight that there can be no validity when one hopes to derive validity, when one
wants to find validity in an external relation of one norm to another. To overcome
relative positivism and enter absolute positivism all one has to do is to give up
this belief that the validity of one norm can be found in an external relation it has
to another norm.
The argument runs parallel to the overcoming of Agrippa’s trilemma in epistemo-
logical debates about the impossibility of justification in general. In that context
the sceptical argument claims that no belief can be justified since any belief can
be justified only by another justified belief, which again leads us into the known
trilemma. Now, the classical Kantian way out of this trilemmatic structure has
been to rethink our understanding of what a relation is:
‘What is negated in all three arguments of the trilemma of justification is the
nativeness and independence of the relation. To the ontological bias of our
realist common sense the relation is but the empty and variable space
between the actual things, between the substances, between the empirically
given entities. In contrast to this thing-ontological dogmatism, scepticism
correctly draws from all this the conclusion, that our cognition of the actual
existing things is variable and fundamentally empty.’14
As long as we stick with our realist common sense, i.e., the idea that what is
actual are the things and that the relation between these things is only contin-
gent, secondary and external to them, then we should not be surprised that our
relation to these things also turns out to be contingent and ultimately external to
these things. It is thus our realist ontological commitments tacitly implicit in our
common sense, which lead to the epistemological impasse of the impossibility of
knowing anything. Consequently, it is in the name of having a promising episte-
mology, i.e., in the name of being able to know anything at all, that we have to
criticize, rethink and ultimately change our ontological commitments. Ultimately,
this means that we have to take the relation to be the actually existing entity and
the ‘thing’ to be the secondary entity. This is what the Kantian reformulation of
14 Kurt Walter Zeidler, Grundriß der Transzendentalen Logik (Cuxhaven: Traude Junghans Verlag,
1997), 149.
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the object from being a ‘thing in itself’ to being a ‘phenomenon’ or, which is the
same, a ‘thing for us’ actually means.15
Now, in facing the trilemma jurisprudence has to demand from juristic common
sense to go through a similar critique and ultimately overthrow of its implicit
ontological commitments: it demands a reversal of the conviction that the rela-
tion is secondary and external to the relata to the conviction that the relation is
fundamental and primary.
In the legal context this means the following:16 relative positivism takes the law
to be a sum, an aggregate of legal norms, the relation of which is external to these
legal norms. Its fundamental thesis, the sources thesis, states that a norm derives
its validity from another positive norm. However, derived it must be! Absolute
positivism, in contrast, starts with the insight that the impossibility of establish-
ing legal validity by means of derivation stems from the separation of the law into
a legal norm, on the one hand, and the grounding of validity, on the other. Abso-
lute Positivism, in contrast, accepts that the law is not a sum of legal norms which
are then, successively, somehow related to each other, but rather that the positive
law itself is legal relation. The law is not a collection of norms, but the relation of
these norms, i.e., it is the creation, justification and application of norms. To say
that the positive law actually is legal relation is simply to say that the law is legal
process.
To claim that the law is legal process means that the problem of the validity of a
legal norm is not a philosophical or jurisprudential problem, but a legal problem
to be solved not by legal theory but by the law itself.17 For absolute positivism
validity is not to be determined by legal theory, but by positive law itself.18 One is
tempted to adduce the unlikely support of Dworkin here, who claimed that juris-
prudence was the general part of adjudication, i.e., that the task which we believe
15 See Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defence (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983), 29.
16 For some reasons why the transcendental argument looks slightly different in the legal context
than it does in the context of theoretical philosophy, see Christoph Kletzer, ‘Kelsen, Sander, and
the Gegenstandsproblem of Legal Science,’ German Law Journal 12 (2011): 785-810.
17 This is not Raz’s point, that legal propositions are internal to a legal discourse and do not make
sense outside of such a discourse or Hart’s point that questions about what ‘legally’ ought to hap-
pen only makes sense relative to a discourse constituted by the rule of recognition. It is not about
a discourse at all. It is a claim about the actual legal process, i.e., about what legislators, judges,
legal officials, and, ultimately, legal subjects do and how an interpretation of these actions is
schematised by legal rules.
18 Nino’s helpful distinction between ‘rules’ and ‘judgements of validity’ leading to two different
chains of derivation takes the latter ‘judgements of validity’ to be ‘typically formulated by jurists.’
With ‘jurists’ he presumably has academics in mind. The authentic and thus truly relevant ‘judg-
ments of validity,’ however, do not happen in an academic but in a legal context in the legal proc-
ess itself, i.e., as judgements (in Nino’s sense) done by parliamentarians (judging that the consti-
tution is valid), by judges (judging statutes and constitutions to be valid), by executive forces
(judging court orders, statutes and constitutions to be valid), and by legal subjects (judging exec-
utive commands, court orders, statutes and constitutions to be valid). See Nino, ‘Some Confu-
sions,’ 257.
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is to be fulfilled by legal philosophy, is actually always already fulfilled by the law
itself.19
Absolute positivism thus solves the problem of the validity of law by declaring
that this problem has already been solved by the law itself.20
In identifying validity as a problem to be solved by legal theory, relative positi-
vism implicitly claims a final competence in relation to the determination of legal
validity. It is unaware that in doing that it actually arrogates a legal competence, a
competence, however, which is at odds with its own doctrine of the positivity of
the law. In relative positivism, positivism thus recoils back at itself: the argument
rightfully directed at natural law theory, i.e., that one must not confuse philo-
sophical content with legal content and that the moral philosopher does not have
competence to posit laws, also cuts against relative positivism.
Relative positivism is thus only a semi-positivism, a half-hearted doctrine that is
always exposed to a tu quoque claim.
Absolute positivism, in contrast, makes the precarious attempt not to overstep
the limits of its competences when talking about the positive law. After all, that
there are competences which are conferred by positive law and which can be over-
stepped, this is the fundamental positivistic insight. Absolute positivism thus
does not try to establish the validity of the law, as the validity of the law cannot
be established without giving up the fundamental positivistic convictions. Rather,
19 ‘Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision in law,’ in Law’s
Empire, Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 90.
20 In the context of Bruno Celano’s theory of validity as disquotation this means that we have to
locate the activity of disquotation in the positive law itself (Bruno Celano, ‘Validity As Disquota-
tion,’ Analisi e diritto (1999): 35-77). Here, with ‘disquotation’ the following is meant: just as in a
minimalist theory of truth the trivial criterion of truth can be given as ‘“p” is true iff p,’ or ‘“Snow
is white” is true iff snow is white,’ allowing to disquote sentences, to use a sentence which was
formerly only mentioned, to make p out of ‘p,’ in Celano’s disquotational theory of validity a simi-
lar relation applies: ‘the norm “q” is valid iff q,’ or ‘The norm “Children ought to obey their
parents” is valid iff children ought to obey their parents.’ Now, Celano thinks that the disquota-
tional statements are statements of meta-jurisprudence, and that ‘validity’ is a device in the
vocabulary of ‘a substantive ethical theory purporting to specify the conditions under which the
law, or particular legal norms, ought to be obeyed’ (235), i.e., it belongs to the vocabulary of an
inquiry into what the law ought to be and ‘not to the vocabulary of a scientific description of
positive law as it actually is. This latter is, however, precisely the use to which validity as disquo-
tation has been put, in the Pure Theory of Law, by Kelsen himself. In the Pure Theory of Law, a
conceptual, necessary relation holds between positive law, on the one hand, and validity (validity
as disquotation) on the other hand: positive legal norms are, as such, binding’ (236). In Kelsen’s
work the concept of disquotation, conversely, rightly features as a technique not of meta-ethics
or legal science but of the positive law itself. Of course, for Kelsen positive legal norms ‘as such’
can never be binding since positive legal norms ‘as such,’ i.e., irrespective of their relation to
other legal norms, separated from the legal process, are not positive legal norms. In contrast to
what Celano writes, Kelsen’s criterion of binding force is this: ‘“p” has binding force, if another
norm q as a scheme of interpretation allows interpreting it as having binding force.’ Or: ‘p’ has
binding force if another norm q disquotes ‘p.’
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it lets the law be, it lets it be valid, it lets the mode of validity immanent in the law
be itself. It thus defers all competence to the law itself.
This deferral of the problem of validity of the law to the law itself finds its legal
expression in the basic norm.21 The basic norm marks the borderline between law
and legal theory. As we have seen above, the positive law, if it wants to be valid as
positive law, must not depend in its validity on conditions given to it by legal
theory, but has to posit the conditions of validity for itself. Now, it does precisely
that in presupposing (German ‘voraus-setzen’ or pre-positing) the conditions of
validity in the basic norm.22
The law presupposes the basic norm. Now, since Kelsen sometimes writes that we
can presuppose the basic norm but do not have to presuppose the basic norm,23
one might be under the impression that the presupposition of the basic norm is a
psychological act.
However, the presupposition of the basic norm is not a psychological act but a
logical relation. It is not the case that one first has to presuppose the basic norm
in order to then say something about the law. Rather one has always already pre-
supposed the basic norm by, for instance, questioning the validity of a putative
legal norm, as questioning the validity of a legal norm means asking if amongst
the other valid legal norms there is one that authorizes the creation of the norm
in question. In asking this question, one has already presupposed the validity of
other norms and thus the validity of the basic norm. One cannot ask a legal ques-
tion, one cannot say or think anything legal without already having presupposed
the basic norm. Presupposing the basic norm thus is not a psychological accident
but is by logical necessity implied in speaking about the law.24 The law presuppo-
ses its own validity. It is thus the law and not we that presupposes the basic norm
and presupposing the basic norm the positive law posits itself.
One can, of course, avoid presupposing the basic norm. However, one can only do
so by not speaking or thinking about the law as law. Thus the presupposition of
the basic norm is more of an academic and less of a legal problem.
The presupposition of the basic norm brings us into the internal space of the law.
In the presupposition of the basic norm the law tells us what is law and what are
21 ‘The basic norm is a judgment of validity,’ yet at the same time ‘this fundamental judgement of
validity, according to Kelsen, is itself a norm.’ Nino, ‘Some Confusions,’ 258.
22 ‘Auch das Voraussetzen ist ein Setzen, aber ein Setzen, das das Setzen zugleich als aufgehoben
setzt. [Presupposing, too, is a positing. It is a positing, however, which posits its own positing as
cancelled.]’ Dieter Henrich, Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), 120.
23 See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed (Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2000), 224.
24 See Uta Bindreiter, ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm,’ Ratio Juris 14 (2001): 143-75, 168: ‘It seems
that the presupposition of the basic norm was intended, by Kelsen, to evoke a specifically “legal”
use of language. Since the linguistic form of norm-formulations (used to issue norms) and of
norm-statements (used to “describe” norms) may well be exactly the same, the difference
between norm-formulation and norm-statement must lie in the illocutionary force of the respec-
tive utterances.’
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legally relevant facts. Viewed from this inside there is no reality outside of the law
that is independent of the law yet relevant to it.
Thus philosophy has nothing to tell the law which the law would not know from
itself. If there is to be law then it is by necessity. Put differently: viewed from the
point of view of the law the law exists necessarily and the validity of the law
leaves open no meaningful questions to be answered by legal philosophy. Viewed
from the point of view of philosophy, however, there can be no positive law and
no legal validity. Relative positivism is but the law viewed from the point of view
of philosophy. The irresolvable paradox it faces is that, for it, there can be no valid
law at all.
So it is the positive law itself that has fulfilled and completed a task which philos-
ophy has set itself and which it necessarily failed at completing, since a law that is
in need of a constitution through philosophy cannot be positive law. Relative
positivism is a philosophical doctrine which thinks it is a doctrine about the law,
but which actually is a doctrine about its own, i.e., philosophy’s, supreme compe-
tence, a doctrine, however, which conflicts with its own positivistic commit-
ments. As a theory of the supreme competence of philosophy and reason, relative
positivism is actually closer to a natural law theory than it might think. Whereas
relative positivism takes reason and its mouthpiece philosophy to be the final
arbiter of all formal questions relating to the law, natural law theory takes reason
and its mouthpiece philosophy to be the final arbiter of all questions relating to
the law. In relation to natural law, relative positivism has given up some compe-
tences over the positive law. Absolute positivism surrenders all competences over
the positive law.
Absolute positivism is thus aware that it is a philosophical doctrine about philoso-
phy, about the limits of philosophy. As such a philosophical doctrine about the
limits and incompetence of philosophy, absolute positivism to a certain extent
has to be both a reflexive and also an anti-philosophical doctrine.25
3  Conclusion
A true positivism thus has to be able to bear these anti-philosophical tendencies
within it. Positivism cannot be itself without at the same time being a doctrine
about the end of philosophy, about the outpour of philosophy into the world.
Insofar as the loss of God has meant that philosophy was promoted from the
25 The reflexive nature of positivism comes to light as an inner dividedness of positivism. Positi-
vism was always torn between a philosophical and a decidedly anti-philosophical strand. A
throughout philosophical positivism is a more recent phenomenon and positivistic tradition is
rife with strong anti-philosophical tendencies. There is, for instance, the common opinion that
the philosophical reflection of the law relates to the positive law as institutes to pandects, i.e., as
textbook introduction to the real law. Philosophy can help write textbooks for novices. However,
it cannot help us master the complexity of the positive law itself. See Friedrich Carl von Savigny,
Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967),
115.
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maidservant (ancilla) to the vicar of theology, we can say that only an absolute
positivism can free itself from a mode of thinking that was formed by the para-
digms of theology. For the problem with the loss of God is not only that we lose
the firm foundations of the divine rules and the secular rules based on these
divine rules. Rather the problem is that the loss of God has changed the paradigm
of the validity of rules itself. Without God rules hold and apply differently, they
are valid in a different manner and sense. And whereas relative positivism privily
awaits the revelation of a final validity, awaits and lacks the absolute, absolute
positivism has learned the full lesson of the absolute immanence of validity: the
world does not lack legitimacy. Neither does the law.26
This paper tried to read the Pure Theory as an attempt to formulate an absolutely
positivistic theory of law. It tried to move Kelsen away from the middle way and
to understand his theory as a philosophical grappling with the radical self-consti-
tution of legal validity.
However, since the Pure Theory does not only attempt to deal with legal validity,
but also tries to present a programme of legal scientific work and since absolute
positivism with its anti-philosophical tendency is an unpopular position, the pro-
posed reading is of course precarious. It is, however, both promising and much
needed, since it defends the Pure Theory against the charge of inconsistency and
tries to formulate a coherent idea of the Pure Theory.
26 See also, Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
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